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RUSSIAN THREAT TO OUR GAS SUPPLY
It seems uncanny how history is repeating itself in the Ukraine. Three
years ago we had a similar situation when Gazprom in dispute with
Naftagaz celebrated the New Year by cutting off Russian gas supplies
through the Ukraine. On the face of it each time it is a business
dispute about money but, of course, life isn't that simple.
In 2006 cutting the flow of gas meant a dramatic reduction in supply
to central European states and was more like an electric shock as the
implications sank in across the whole of Europe. The EU Energy
Commissioner Piebalgs was galvanised into action to mediate in the
dispute and make the gas flow again. This time the dispute seems
determined to rumble on and one could argue the outlook is worse than
three years ago. However the background and the implications for EU
energy policy remain pretty much the same.
Europe is increasingly dependent on imported natural gas. Our main
source of supply is Russia, followed by Norway, Algeria and, recently,
LNG (Liquefied National Gas) from the Middle East and Qatar in
particular. Once upon a time there was a policy not to use gas for
generating electricity but that went by the board when it became
apparent there were plentiful resources with the Netherlands, UK North
Sea deposits and nearby.
I recall doing a report for the European Parliament some 10 years ago
on the prospects for gas supply in Europe. Then I was taken to task by
representatives of the industry for suggesting there was a security of
supply risk if any one fuel or technology provided more than 25% of
final consumption. They said this could place unjustified constraints
on the industry. Well I rest my case with the observation that we are
even more dependent on oil - some 45% of final energy consumption.
The gas that Russia supplies to Europe comes through a number of
pipelines and quite a large proportion transits through the Ukraine.
This is not a one sided trade because we pay hard currency and the
Russian economy is heavily dependent on this flow of money. In former
times the transit through Ukraine was not seen as a problem since the
two countries were perceived as more or less indivisible within the
Soviet Union and its successor the Commonwealth of Independent States.
In particular the Ukraine enjoyed what I would call favourable
internal prices and transit fees since both countries received
benefits from the much higher export prices. As soon as the Ukraine
started asserting its independence and began looking westward for a
closer association with the EU the rules of the game changed. In one
sense one can understand a Russian line of thought that says if you
want to go off and join the rich countries club then you can start
paying the same price as they do.
Likewise one can understand the counter argument by the Ukraine which
was that we must charge market rates for transit rights and, possibly,
even a premium for our strategic importance. And, of course, there is
a Russian interest in stirring up internal debate and dissension
between the pro-Russian and pro-Western elements of the Ukraine.
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So much for background now what about the
implications for Europe? Until three years ago I would have argued
that the mutual benefit in the trade of gas for currency was a sound
basis for doing business and posed relatively small risks so far as
security of supply is concerned. Not any more. In recent years there
is a greater emphasis placed on climate change policy which has meant
a fundamental shift in attitudes toward the consumption of fossil
fuels pushing us in the direction of reduction, substitution and
alternative technologies. So it seems to me these two strands of
energy policy are no longer in stark competition but finding much
common ground.
However we cannot wean ourselves off gas overnight. In the short to
medium term there are a number of things to be done to address the
security of supply issues. Ironically one is to reassess attitudes
towards building alternative pipelines for delivering Russian and
central Asian gas to Europe. There has been much controversy over the
Nordstream proposed pipeline through the Baltic Sea but from a West
European perspective this could be a way of by-passing the Ukraine. A
more remote prospect is the Nabucco pipeline proposal which would be
routed through Turkey to bring gas from central Asia or even possibly
Iran.
We have to find alternatives in the medium to long term to the present
levels of gas consumed in generating electricity. For that I see two
options, both of which should be pursued. Renewable energy is
available in many forms, not all of which are reliable. Some hold out
huge promise, such as ambitious plans to create a super grid of
offshore wind generation or equally ambitious solar power generation
in the Sahara linked to the European transmission system across the
Mediterranean. Such large scale facilities will take a long time to
develop and, of course will require a lot of capital.
The other option will also take time and capital to develop. Nuclear
energy presently supplies 31% of EU electricity. It is reliable base
load electricity and has considerable potential for increased
capacity, maybe up to 40% of electricity consumed. Of course it
represents a much smaller share of final energy consumption so it is
unlikely to breach the 25% level. But building a new nuclear power
station can take 10-15 years taking all the planning, consultation,
design and construction stages into account so it is not exactly going
to help switch the gas back on tomorrow or, more to the point, replace
it.
In my view we need to pursue all these options for the joint reasons
of climate change and security of supply. This is not all that we can
or should be doing. Making our economy and homes more energy efficient
is obviously one solution but seems to be easier said than done. And
the other area for action is to increase research into all energy
sources as well as the development of new technologies. So there us
plenty we can do but will the need for urgency be kept to the fore
once the immediate Ukraine crisis subsides?
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